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1. Introduction 
 
The principle of non-intervention is one of great importance in the 
international legal system but at the same time one of complex defini-
tion. This is due to doubts regarding both the content of that principle 
(for example, whether it covers any and all types of external interven-
tion in a foreign territory or just the most significant forms of interven-
tion, as the armed interventions) and the links between the principle in 
question and other fundamental principles of international law (for ex-
ample, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of for-
eign States, the principle of prohibition of the use of force and the prin-
ciple of self-determination). 
In particular, the link between the principle of non-intervention and 
the principle of prohibition of the use of force would appear to be evi-
dent in the framework of both international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts. The link between the two principles was 
highlighted by the United Nations General Assembly as far back as the 
well known resolutions no 2625 of 24 October 1970 (XXV)1 and no 
3314 of 14 December 1974 (XXIX)2 as well as by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case3 and in the Armed Activities case.4 
 
* Full Professor of International Law, Luiss Guido Carli, Department of Law. 
1 See UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) ‘Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. 
2 See art 3, subparagraph g) of UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) 
‘Definition of Aggression’. 
3 See the Judgement of 27 June 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ 
Rep 98 ff (para 187 ff). 
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It is common ground that the principle of non-intervention, at times 
identified with the principle of neutrality, is indisputably applicable ‘to 
all international armed conflict’5 while its very existence and content are 
rather less clear as regards non-international armed conflicts. 
It is my intention in this article, which summarises part of a wider 
work recently published in Italian,6 to demonstrate that the principle of 
external non-intervention in civil wars has never actually taken hold in 
international law except for the part concerning a ban on supporting 
insurrectionary movements and that recent practice bears this out. I al-
so highlight a growing although not yet consolidated trend that permits 
support, even military support, to be lent to a specific category of insur-
rectionary movements, namely, those that fight against dictatorial re-
gimes that do not hesitate during civil war to employ brutal methods 
against the civilian population. 
It will be shown that this recent practice exhibits some links, even if 
not yet systemic, with other regimes and principles of international law 
such as the regime concerning violations of erga omnes obligations con-
tained in peremptory norms, humanitarian intervention and remedial 
secession, thereby constituting an overall reaction – even if not easily 
discernible at this moment – to grave violations of the essential values of 
the international community. 
 
 
2. Summary of the literature on external intervention in civil wars and 
my position 
 
At international level scholars have carefully analysed the question 
of intervention by third party States in civil wars, thereby dwelling on 
the existence and content of the principle of neutrality.7 
 
4 See the Judgment of 19 December 2005, Case Concerning the Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 
223 ff (para 148 ff). 
5 See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 261 (para 89). 
6 P Pustorino, Movimenti insurrezionali e diritto internazionale (Cacucci Editore 
2018). 
7 For a wide-ranging and precise analysis of the numerous strands of thought and 
practice regarding external intervention in non-international armed conflicts, see O 
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In short, some authors assert that there is a general and ‘absolute’ 
principle of non-intervention or neutrality in civil wars, which prohibits 
third party countries from lending support to any side in the internal 
armed conflict.8 According to this stance, there are no exceptions to the 
application of the principle of neutrality although the advocates of this 
view are not unanimous as regards when exactly the principle of neu-
trality must be applied since some scholars maintain that one must pre-
liminarily establish the existence of a highly intense internal armed con-
flict. Moreover, a number of scholars in this respect argue that only the 
most significant forms of support for the various sides in an internal 
armed conflict are prohibited, in particular military-type support. In-
deed, for some scholars the ban on helping or assisting both sides of an 
internal armed conflict covers solely direct military intervention and the 
sending of military advisers and trainers while any assistance ‘short of 
tactical military support’9 is lawful. 
It should also be noted that the authors who espouse the existence 
of the said general principle of neutrality are split between those who 
maintain that it constitutes a principle that is totally separate on an in-
ternational level and those who by contrast consider that it is a ‘deriva-
tive’ principle that operates to protect other fundamental principles of 
international law, including above all the principle that prohibits the 
use of force, the principle of self-determination of peoples and, more 
recently, fundamental human rights. These ‘over-arching’ principles re-
ferred to when analysing and applying the principle of neutrality are 
sometimes invoked individually and other times ‘collectively’, ie relying 
on all the said principles. 
For other authors, the principle of neutrality exists but only ‘in one 
direction’, in the sense that international law still permits support for 
governments in power during civil wars but prohibits any type of sup-
 
Corten, ‘La rébellion et le droit international: le principe de neutralité en tension’ 
(2014) 373 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 53. 
8 See L Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of 
the Government’ (1986) 56 British YB Intl L 242-244; K Bannelier, T Christakis, 
‘Volenti non fit injuria? Les effets du consentement à l’intervention militaire’ (2004) 50 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 116. 
9 See TJ Farer, ‘Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign 
Intervention in Civil Strife’ (1969) 82 Harvard L Rev 532 and 540. 
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port in favour of insurgents,10 except for the well known ‘humanitarian’ 
exception cited by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua 
case.11 Even within the framework of this school of thought, it is gener-
ally maintained that the most serious and continuous forms of support 
for insurgents must be analysed in light of the prohibition of the use of 
force and of the principle of self-determination of peoples while less se-
rious forms can be considered as violations minoris generis of the pro-
hibition of the use of force or violations of the principle of non-
interference or simply as unfriendly conduct towards governments in 
power but not banned by international law.  
By contrast, other authors consider – although with positions that 
vary considerably – that military, economic and political support in fa-
vour of any category of insurgents is lawful thereby negating the exist-
ence of the principle of neutrality12 whereas other scholars argue that 
external intervention in support of the two sides of an internal armed 
conflict is lawful on condition that it can be considered as a counter-
intervention in the wake of previous foreign intervention in favour of 
the government in power.13 This stance would appear to be based on 
the need to balance out the opposing interventions, which should be 
examined also in light of the principle of proportionality. Consequently, 
the content and effects of the second intervention should be commen-
surate with the extent and effects of the first intervention. 
In my opinion the principle of neutrality, with reference to its appli-
cation to all the parties of civil wars, has never been established at in-
ternational level. This view is based on the evident contradictions that 
can be gleaned from ample practice as reviewed in the literature, also 
 
10 See M Bennouna, Le consentement à l’ingérence militaire dans les conflits internes 
(LGDJ 1974) 213. 
11 In words of the Court ‘There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political 
affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other 
way contrary to international law’: Military and Paramilitary Activities (n 3) 124 (para 
242). 
12 In this sense see E Lieblich, ‘Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible 
Interventions in Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements’ (2011) 29 
Boston U Intl L J 337 ff; GH Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ Wayne State U Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper Series no 2014-04 available at ˂www.ssrn.com/ 
link/Wayne-State-U-LEG.html˃. 
13 O Corten, The Law Against War. The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 301 ff. 
The principle of non-intervention in recent non-international armed conflicts                  21 
 
having regard to the formation or consolidation of other international 
legal principles like those of the self-determination of peoples and dem-
ocratic legitimacy,14 thereby giving rise to solutions that can differ for 
case that are actually very similar.15 In my opinion, stating the contrary 
is tantamount to stretching what can actually be deduced from past (ie 
the Spanish civil war) and present practice (Mali, Syria, Yemen) in or-
der to protect at any cost some fundamental principles of international 
law. 
Moreover, with reference to support also of a military nature in fa-
vour of the government in power in cases of both grave internal disor-
der and veritable civil wars, the validity of the consent given by regime 
in power – without the democratic nature of the government in power 
having any real bearing on the matter – has been upheld in Internation-
al Court of Justice caselaw. As far back as its judgment in the Nicaragua 
case, the Court held that the intervention of third party States is ‘allow-
able at the request of the government of a State’.16 And in its judgment 
in the Armed Activities case, the Court did not doubt the lawfulness at 
international level of the presence of Ugandan troops in Congo con-
sistent with the express consent given by the government of that coun-
try. The matter disputed by the two States concerned solely the content 
and limits to the consent and when exactly it had subsequently been 
withdrawn.17 
Better established would seem to be the tendency to rule out the 
lawfulness of external military or economic intervention in favour of in-
surrectionary movements. From this standpoint, worthy of note is again 
International Court of Justice case law. In its judgment in the Nicaragua 
case and with particular reference to the question of the validity of the 
consent given by the Contras insurrectionary movement to intervention 
by the United States, the Court stated that the principle of non-
intervention ‘would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if 
 
14 Regarding the importance of the principle of self-determination of peoples and 
the principles on human rights on the progressive formation of the prohibition to 
intervene against the government in power or the insurgents, see Farer (n 9) 513 ff. 
15 To quote O Corten (n 7) 85, 26-127 and 288, who however concludes that the 
relevant practice in the matter could be interpreted overall in the sense that ‘le principe 
de neutralité n’a pas été mis en cause dans son existence même’ (293). 
16 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities (n 3) 126 (para 246). 
17 ICJ, Armed Activites (n 4) 196 ff (para 42 ff). 
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intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made 
by an opposition group in another State’. The Court highlight how the 
principle of non-intervention would be greatly impaired if one were to 
subscribe to the view that considers intervention at the behest of an in-
surrectionary movement as lawful, stating that ‘it is difficult to see what 
would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if 
intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the govern-
ment of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition. 
This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the internal 
affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government or at 
the request of its opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court’s 
view correspond to the present state of international law’.18 
The unlawfulness of external armed intervention in favour of insur-
rectionary movements is confirmed by the International Court of Justice 
in the Armed Activities case, in which the Court held that the direct and 
indirect military support that Uganda lent to the Mouvement de libéra-
tion congolais was a violation of the principles of non-interference and 
the prohibition of use of force irrespective of the specific aims of the in-
tervention in question and therefore ‘even if the objectives of Uganda 
were not to overthrow President Kabila, and were directed to securing 
towns and airports for reason of its perceived needs’.19 
Specifically determining which rules and principles of international 
law are violated in the case of external intervention in favour of insur-
gents obviously depends on the type of intervention undertaken in fa-
vour of the insurgents – direct or indirect, military or economic inter-
vention, etc – as well as the other characteristics of the intervention in 
terms especially of duration and intensity of the foreign action.20 From a 
general perspective it is arguable that if military intervention is most 
likely to amount to a violation of the principle that prohibits the use of 
force in international relations, economic intervention or even signifi-
cant political support (for example, early recognition of the insurrec-
tionary movement) could amount to a violation of the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of the country in a state of civil war. 
 
18 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities (n 3) 116 (para 246). 
19 ICJ, Armed Activities (n 4) 227 (para 163). 
20 On this point see Pustorino (n 6) 227-243. 
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Again in this situation one can cite what the International Court of 
Justice stated in the Nicaragua case, in which it held that ‘while the arm-
ing and training of the contras can certainly be said to involve the threat 
or use of force against Nicaragua, this is not necessarily so in respect of 
all the assistance given by the United States Government. In particular, 
the Court considers that the mere supply of funds to the contras…, does 
not in itself amount to a use of force’. Therefore, support of an econom-
ic nature, regardless of the extent thereof, constitutes for the court ‘un-
doubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua’.21 
 
 
3. Examination of practice, with particular reference to recent cases of 
external intervention in favour of insurgents who are fighting against 
brutal and dictatorial governments 
 
The examination of practice in relation to external intervention in 
non-international armed conflicts leads one to rule out that the princi-
ple of neutrality applies to all the parties of internal armed conflicts. 
In particular, some important cases dating back many years, wheth-
er before or after the entry into force of the UN Charter, clearly reveal – 
at least as regards military and economic support in favour of a gov-
ernment in power engaged in a civil war – that third party States and 
international organisations did not at all feel obliged to refrain from in-
tervening in support of government. One of the best known cases is the 
Spanish civil war (1936-1939), with military and economic support lent 
to both sides in the internal armed conflict. Another well know case was 
the attempted secession of Katanga and the attendant declaration of in-
dependence of 11 July 1960, which involved also the United Nations in 
two respects: the setting up of a peace-keeping operation, which effec-
tively helped the government of Congo to restore law and order in the 
country22 and the Security Council’s express deprecation of the seces-
sionist activities carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, 
 
21 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities (n 3) 119 (para 228). 
22 See UNSC Res 146 (9 August 1960) which, totally inconsistent with what would 
be the role actually played by the peacekeepers in Congo, states that ‘the United 
Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used 
to influence the outcome of any internal conflict’: para 4. 
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explicitly categorised as ‘illegal’ and contrary to previous Security 
Council resolutions.23  
As mentioned above, in less recent practice, the prohibition of ex-
ternal intervention in favour of insurrectionary movements would seem 
to hold sway even if there are exceptions. It should be noted that in the 
past military and economic intervention in favour of insurrectionary 
movements was undertaken almost always indirectly and in secret, for 
example through private parties or States other than that which was ef-
fectively providing the support. In particular, the economic and military 
support by United States to the National Union for the Total Independ-
ence of Angola (UNITA) was provided through Zaire with the aim to 
overthrow the communist regime formed by the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).24 
Any analysis of recent practice confirms that the principle of neu-
trality is not a customary one given that some international organisa-
tions and various States – European and non-European, whether part of 
the West or other geo-political blocs – have intervened in numerous 
armed conflicts (Mali, Syria and Yemen) or in situations that are half-
way between a civil war and grave internal disorders and tensions, as in 
the case of Bahrain.25 The interventions in question were undertaken by 
States in support of various factions in conflict, including insurgents 
pursuing the secession of a specific portion of a State. In some instances 
support was lent to serve the intervening State’s own specific national 
interests, as was the case for the Turkish military intervention against 
the Kurdish-Syrian faction aimed at weakening the latter’s territorial 
claims and thereby avoiding a link up with the Kurdish movement in 
Turkey.  
When it comes to supporting a government in power, foreign inter-
vention has been justified in a variety of ways by the intervening States. 
 
23 See UNSC Res 169 (24 November 1961) paras 1 and 8. 
24 On this case see BS Akca, ‘Supporting Non-state Armed Groups: A Resort to 
Illegality’ (2009) 32 J Strategic Studies 598. 
25 In the case of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened, 
with the support of the Gulf Cooperation Council and at the request of the government 
of Bahrain, to react to turmoil in the country. It should be noted that the level of armed 
conflict in the country was very limited with the result that the Bahrain situation can 
most likely be classified as one that was more than mere unrest and internal tension but 
less than civil war. Regarding that intervention see Corten (n 7) 161 ff. 
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In some cases, the States in question have cited a general or specific 
need to combat international terrorism as in Mali for French interven-
tion and in Syria for Russian intervention. In other cases, there was ex-
press or implied reliance on the previously mentioned doctrine of coun-
ter-intervention to address previous foreign intervention, as occurred 
for the Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen in response to presumed 
Iranian intervention. In other cases, external intervention was under-
pinned by the consent given by the government in power, as happened 
for Russian intervention in Syria and for French intervention in Mali, or 
was based on UN Security Council resolutions interpreted in a broad 
manner if not in a totally spurious way to legitimise the armed interven-
tion, as occurred for the intervention in Libya by NATO and some in-
dividual States. There have also been interventions professed to have 
been undertaken in the name of collective or individual self-defence, as 
occurred for the French intervention in Mali. Leaving aside their rather 
dubious foundation from an international standpoint, those types of jus-
tifications are proffered on a single basis but frequently also together in 
a package of different and vague justifications that at times contradict 
each other. The French intervention in Mali and the Russian interven-
tion in Syria are emblematic in this regard. 
The recent experience examined above demonstrates that States in-
tervening alongside a government in power rule out that their actions 
contrast with the principle of neutrality or with the principle that pro-
hibits the use of force. Moreover, protests from other States or interna-
tional organisations against such interventions are rather limited and for 
the most part tend to focus on contesting the ‘truthfulness’ of some spe-
cific legal basis cited to underpin the intervention, as occurred when 
some States complained that Russia’s intervention in Syria was not ef-
fectively aimed at fighting terrorism but rather, as turned out to be the 
case, to push back against Syrian rebels and prop up Assad’s Regime. In 
the same case, the protests did not question the lasting validity of the 
Syrian regime’s consent to the external intervention.26 
One of the possible and most significant limits to external interven-
tion in civil wars is given by the principle of self-determination of peo-
ples. 
 
26 For more details on the different states’ positions see the contribution of O 
Corten in this zoom-in. 
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In relation to a specific clash between external armed intervention 
in favour of the government in power and the principle of self-
determination of peoples, I believe that especially in particularly intense 
and long internal armed conflicts – like the recent conflicts in Libya, 
Syria and Yemen – it is extremely difficult to apply the principle of self-
determination of peoples because it is virtually impossible to ascertain 
whether the national population is in favour of one or other of the sides 
in the conflict. Moreover, the relationship between the principle of ex-
ternal intervention and the principle of self-determination of peoples, 
and more in general the protection of fundamental human rights, is not 
at all just ‘one way’, in the sense that the intervention always disrespects 
the will of the people. On the contrary, the intervention could well op-
erate in the opposite direction with the potential to legitimise external 
intervention should it be demonstrated that it would foster the attain-
ment of the will of the people subjugated in particular by the govern-
ment in power. From this standpoint Corten, referring to the Syrian in-
surrection, cautiously surmises that rébellion-remède could well be a 
possible exception to the neutrality in connection with insurrections 
exhibited by international law, which generally – as Corten points out – 
neither prohibits nor authorises insurrections.27  
It is easy to see how the hypothesis of rébellion-remède could be 
viewed as consistent in some respects with the theory of remedial seces-
sion as a further application of the principle of external self-
determination (in case of grave violation of internal self-determination), 
which, although not generally endorsed by scholars and especially not 
accepted in practice, is based on the same assumption as rébellion-
remède: grave violation of human rights and of the principle of internal 
self-determination. 
What has been asserted just now dictates that great caution must be 
exercised in ascertaining a presumed conflict between external interven-
tions in support of a government in power or an insurrectionary move-
ment and the principle of self-determination of peoples. 
It needs to be clarified that the lawfulness of external intervention 
to bolster a government in power does not obviously extend to de facto 
governments formed at times on the basis of unlawful military occupa-
tion as is the case with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, creat-
 
27 Corten (n 7) 297 ff. 
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ed in the wake of the Turkish military occupation of 1974, or the de fac-
to governments installed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia relying on Rus-
sian military support.  
Similarly, external intervention is to be considered as unlawful when 
it is designed to favour ‘States’ or terrorist type governments as in the 
case of ISIS. Consequently, general economic support, the specific sale 
of arms or the acquisition of goods (for example, oil), mentioned by 
some with reference to ISIS, in the period when that insurrectionary 
and terrorist organisation was particularly effective, constitutes a grave 
violation of fundamental principles of international law such as the pro-
hibition of the use of force and the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other States. It also amounts to a violation of article 
48 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, with particular reference to paragraph 2 of that 
article in accordance with which ‘No State shall recognize as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, 
nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation’. Therefore, it 
would seem correct to assert that the conclusion by States of commer-
cial contracts of any nature with ISIS would contribute to recognising 
and if anything maintaining the legal and factual situation stemming 
from the serious breach of international law, in particular the grave vio-
lations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed 
by ISIS in the territories that it temporarily took control of, especially at 
the expense of the Iraqi and Syrian governments.28 
Obviously, if the government in power independently or with the 
help and assistance of third party countries commits internationally 
wrongful acts while actually combating insurrectionary movements, the 
territorial State and the third party States involved will be liable at in-
ternational level on the basis of the customary rules on the international 
responsibility of a State, for example through the conduct of its own or-
gans de jure or de facto or in light of the other customary rules referred 
to in the above cited ILC Draft Articles (Aid or assistance in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act).29 Gross violations of human 
 
28 This approach presupposes that the rules envisaged by the ILC Draft Articles in 
question are applicable also to violations committed by sui generis entities like ISIS. 
29 Regarding the correspondence between general international law and the 
provisions of article 16 of the Draft, see ICJ Case Concerning Application of the 
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rights and international humanitarian law have been committed, for ex-
ample, in Syria, especially by the Assad regime and also by the Russian 
air force against Syrian opposition, and in Yemen by Saudi Arabia dur-
ing the brutal and often indiscriminate aerial campaign conducted 
against the Houthis in Yemen. 
Turning now to examine recent practice (Libya and Syria), in sup-
porting insurrectionary movements, I believe that military, economic or 
political support (the latter in the form of early recognition) given by 
States and international organisations to insurgents who fight against 
dictatorial regimes is lawful where the violations attributed to the gov-
erning regime are grave, clear and independently ascertained at interna-
tional level, in particular by the relevant international bodies as was the 
case for both Libya and Syria, where the UN Security Council, UN 
General Assembly and in a very detailed way the commissions of in-
quiry set up in both instances by the Human Rights Council established 
beyond any doubt. 
It is still too early to say whether this practice can be interpreted as 
a sign of a gradual equivalence between this specific category of insur-
gents and national liberation movements, with particular reference to 
the analogy between, on the one hand, brutal and dictatorial govern-
ments that the insurgents are fighting against and, on the other hand, 
governments installed by foreign powers following military or colonial 
occupation or governments that practice apartheid that national libera-
tion movements are fighting against. However, it is worth bearing in 
mind, for the purposes of drawing a possible analogy between the two 
legal situations, that legal scholars would seem to be in agreement in 
maintaining that external intervention of a political and economic na-
ture in favour of national liberation movements is lawful while harbour-
ing doubts as to the lawfulness of armed intervention in favour of those 
same entities. With particular regard to the external intervention in fa-
vour of the insurgents which fight against brutal and dictatorial gov-
ernments, even the military intervention, as was showed, seems lawful. 
 
 
 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 217 (para 420). 
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4.  Conclusions 
  
Concluding this rapid analysis of the literature and practice, espe-
cially recent, in relation to external intervention in internal armed con-
flicts, one must, firstly, ascertain what the general effects deriving from 
the non-existence of the principle of neutrality applicable to all the par-
ties of civil wars are and, secondly, inquire as to whether there are links 
between the specific trend of considering intervention by third party 
States and international organisations in favour of the insurgents 
fighting against brutal and dictatorial regimes as lawful and other inter-
national principles.  
One of the potential effects at an international level flowing from 
the non-existence of a principle of neutrality in civil wars would be in-
stability in international relations. Naturally, a certain amount of insta-
bility will always be a feature of the international legal system given the 
structure of the international community. This instability is mainly a re-
sult of the equality among its members premised on the fundamental 
principle that States are equal and sovereign and of the absence of any 
higher authority that makes and enforces laws since the UN Security 
Council is far from being a true law-making body recognised as such. 
Therefore, the international legal system is always in tension, to bor-
row an expression dear to Corten and used by the author as aforesaid 
precisely with reference to the principle of neutrality. In my opinion 
tension is natural in all the international legal system and is an expres-
sion of the essential characteristics of the international community. This 
is easily demonstrated by the fact that fundamental principles of inter-
national law often contrast with one another protecting values and in-
terests that are at the same time crucial but competing. Some examples 
are the permanent conflict between the principle of territorial integrity 
and the principle of self-determination of peoples or between the prin-
ciple of national and international security and the protection of human 
rights.  
Moreover, some international principles of great importance like the 
principle of self-determination of peoples may be used in relation to 
various actual cases and sometimes even in relation to the exact same 
case to bolster or to challenge other international principles. For exam-
ple, if the principle of self-determination of peoples is generally invoked 
as aforesaid to deny the lawfulness of external military intervention, one 
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cannot rule out that the principle can be cited – at the very least de lege 
ferenda – also to justify the intervention on the basis of the previously 
mentioned theory of remedial secession.30 
This situation of potential or actual conflict between different prin-
ciples naturally also holds true for the principle that prohibits the use of 
force and its exceptions, ie the attempts to extend the application of 
some exceptions (just think of the ongoing debate on pre-emptive self 
defence). It is indeed a question of competing forces pulling in opposite 
directions that are not only an intrinsic aspect of the international 
community but also an expression of the ‘expansive force’ of the said 
fundamental principles of the international legal system. Those forces 
must be constantly and adequately balanced out to prevent excesses or 
deviations due to an ‘unbridled’ application of certain principles of in-
ternational law that can upset the equilibrium of the international legal 
system.  
In the case of the principle of neutrality as applied to civil wars, the 
needs that compete with the principle that prohibits external interven-
tion in favour of the parties to an internal armed conflict (mainly 
founded on the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of self-
determination of peoples) are based on equally fundamental principles 
of international law, such as the principle of equality of arms in an 
armed conflict, which can be cited in the event of a previous interven-
tion in support of one of the sides in the conflict, or the protection of 
the very principle of self-determination of peoples and protection of 
human rights where external intervention is designed to protect the ci-
vilian population against particularly ferocious and brutal governments.  
It should be noted that the tendency of some States and interna-
tional organisations to support insurrectionary movements that oppose 
brutal and dictatorial governments is certainly independent of other 
principles of international law, in particular, the possibility to adopt col-
lective coercive countermeasures by States not specially affected by a 
violation of an international obligation and the principles (of dubious 
 
30 The point is developed by D Amoroso, ‘Il ruolo del riconoscimento degli insorti 
nella promozione del principio di autodeterminazione interna: considerazioni alla luce 
della “primavera araba”’ Federalismi.it no 21/2013 (23 October 2013) 40-42 available at 
<www.federalismi.it>. 
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existence on an international level) of humanitarian intervention and 
the responsibility to protect. 
However, in one respect the potential future establishment of a 
principle that permits political, economic and even military intervention 
in favour of insurgents who fight against dictatorial regimes that are re-
sponsible of grave violations of international law may have an impact on 
the various principles mentioned, for example, strengthening the view – 
nowadays minority among legal scholars and in practice – in accordance 
with which it is possible to resort to peaceful or even coercive counter-
measures in case of objectively proven grave violations of peremptory 
norms. 
In this regard the practice cited above – though not yet consolidated 
– can, on the one hand, be interpreted as an attempt to specifically bal-
ance out the effects flowing from the enduring legality of external inter-
vention in favour of the government in power, even if that government 
is not actually democratic. On the other hand, that practice can consti-
tute a wider corrective linked to the lasting and in my opinion ill-
advised exclusion – according to the restrictive approach of the ILC – 
of recourse to peaceful or military countermeasures against States re-
sponsible for grave violations of human rights. Accepting that point of 
view, the practice regarding military, economic or more limited support 
in favour of insurgents who fight against brutal and dictatorial govern-
ments can be interpreted overall as serving the purpose of coordinating 
and balancing principles of extreme importance for the international 
community, in particular, the prohibition of the use of force and the 
protection of fundamental values of individuals. 
Solely an examination of the future conduct of States and interna-
tional organisations will reveal in clearer terms whether this attempt is 
destined to remain an isolated one unlikely to contribute to the progres-
sive development of international law or whether it will be confirmed in 
practice. In this latter hypothesis, one will have to ascertain whether the 
practice will remain confined to the ambit of study of external interven-
tion in internal armed conflicts or whether it will end up merging, and if 
so to what extent, with practice in the matter of humanitarian interven-
tion and collective countermeasures adopted following a grave violation 
of peremptory norms and with the theory of remedial secession in the 
framework of analysis of the principle of self-determination of peoples. 
  
